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CROOKED BUSINESS, ENRON STYLE 
Kristopher Kehner† 
Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron. 
By Mimi Schwartz and Sherron Watkins. 
Doubleday, 2003.  386 pages.  $26.00. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ken Lay, Jeffery Skilling, and Andy Fastow were all rich and 
powerful executives at Enron.  Then Enron imploded in a truth-is-
stranger-than-fiction corporate scandal.  But what do we really 
know about the inside culture at Enron; the personalities of Lay, 
Skilling, and Fastow; and the specifics of the scandal?  In the book, 
Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron,1 the reader is 
treated to an inside look at the events, culture, and personalities 
behind the scandal.  In the wake of the Enron scandal, the federal 
government has taken actions to prevent Enron-like disasters, and 
many Enron executives have scurried to avoid legal culpability.2 
II. THE ENRON STORY AS TOLD IN POWER FAILURE: 
LAY, SKILLING, AND FASTOW 
The authors of Power Failure do an excellent job of telling the 
Enron Story.  To truly understand the changes in the law, it helps 
 
  †    J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S. Biochemistry, 
University of Minnesota, magna cum laude, 2000.  Thank you John and Rose—
without your support and encouragement my law school journey would not have 
been possible.    
 1.   MIMI SCHWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (Doubleday 2003).  Co-author Sherron Watkins had 
eight years as an Enron insider.  Id. at 362.   
 2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 
and 29 U.S.C.) (enhancing public disclosures, conflict-of-interest laws, and 
criminal punishment for white-collar crime).  In fact, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
called for an investigation into investment banks and used Enron’s transactions as 
an example.  Id. § 705(a)(1). 
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to know the underlying story of Enron.  The authors of Power 
Failure brilliantly describe the rise and fall of the major players in 
the Enron scandal: Lay, Skilling, and Fastow. 
Lay is portrayed as a person more interested in rubbing 
shoulders with politicians3 and performing philanthropy4 than with 
running Enron.  With Lay not interested in the nuts and bolts 
business of Enron, COO Rich Kinder was left to run the 
corporation.5  Kinder wanted the CEO job when Lay left, which he 
assumed would happen in 1996.6  When Lay renewed as CEO in 
1996, Kinder left.7  In his absence, Jeff Skilling was made COO.8 
One of the most insightful but less-known happenings of the 
Enron scandal was the internal power struggle between Skilling and 
Rebecca Mark.  Mark was “a deal maker.”9  Lay, as was most people, 
was impressed with Mark, and Lay saw her as a possible 
replacement for himself when he stepped down.10  Because Skilling 
wanted Lay’s CEO job, Skilling saw Mark as a threat.11  In an effort 
to push her out, Skilling planted an attorney named Amanda 
Martin to keep an eye on Mark.12  Skilling used Martin’s 
information to point out the weaknesses in Mark’s projects.13  The 
authors described this as “Mark walk[ing] blithely into a trap . . . .”14  
However, the trap was merely running a business.15  While I 
thought the authors went too far in romanticizing Mark with this 
language, I understood why Mark was forced out of Enron—
survival of the meanest.  When the business Mark ran foundered, 
 
 3. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 24, 120, 196.  “Lay[,] . . . with 
powerful allies[,] handpicked [a congressman’s] replacement.”  Id. at 196. 
 4. See id. at 195.  Enron gave to museums and had the baseball field of the 
Houston Astros named Enron Field.  See id.  Further, “Lay became a hero to the 
African American community . . . a godfather to local black businessmen.”  Id. at 
195-96.  Of course, with all this philanthropy, it is no surprise that Lay claims to 
have no knowledge of the shenanigans that went on at Enron. See Matt Daily, 
Enron’s Ken Lay Denies Wrongdoing (Jan. 19, 2004), at http://www.namibian. 
com.na/2004/january/marketplace/041C50118F.html (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 5. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 36. 
 6. See id. at 99. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. at 106-07. 
 10. See id. at 108, 117. 
 11. See id. at 107-08. 
 12. See id. at 109. 
 13. See id. at 110, 116-17. 
 14. Id. at 198. 
 15. See id. at 198-99. 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/11
KEHNER- READY.DOC 5/20/2004  9:44 PM 
2004] CROOKED BUSINESS, ENRON STYLE 1583 
she was fired.16 
With this type of infighting, it is no surprise that people like 
Andy Fastow came into power.  Fastow has come to embody all that 
was wrong with Enron, a point that came across powerfully in Power 
Failure.  Fastow worked his way up the ranks of Enron and became 
one of Skilling’s favorites.17  Despite failing at running his first 
division,18 Fastow rededicated himself to Enron in an attempt to 
keep his job.19 
Fastow realized that “no one at Enron seemed to care how he 
had financed [a project] . . . .”20  Being desperate to keep his job, 
Fastow began creating special-purpose entities that essentially 
created a loan that does not show up as debt on the balance sheet.21  
These special-purpose entities required a third party to buy three 
percent of the entity, thereby making the third party the owner, but 
allowed Enron to run the entity and own the other ninety-seven 
percent of the entity, essentially keeping the benefits of ownership 
without any of the downsides.22  Of course, the third-party investor 
stood to make millions of dollars on relatively small investments.23  
The authors of Power Failure were most impressive when they 
described these complex financial transactions—they put these 
extremely complex business deals into understandable terms. 
Unfortunately for Enron, these special-purpose entities were 
what finally caused the ultimate collapse of the corporation.24  The 
special-purpose entity agreements contained a clause that called for 
acceleration of the debt if their bond grade dropped below 
investment grade.25 That debt was never reported on the balance 
sheets.26  The $3.9 billion of off-balance sheet debt was triggered 
when the grade of the bonds fell below investment grade, forcing 
Enron into bankruptcy.27 
A more shocking allegation in Power Failure was that Fastow 
 
 16. See id. at 200.  It is not as though Mark was left out in the cold; she sold 
her Enron stock for $80 million.  See id. 
 17. See id. at 151-52. 
 18. See id. at 157. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. at 159. 
 21. See id. at 160. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. at 163. 
 24. See id. at 330, 339. 
 25. See id. at 330. 
 26. See id. at 160. 
 27. See id. at 339. 
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engaged in many conflict-of-interest transactions.  Enron needed a 
third party to invest $11 million to make the three percent to form 
a special-purpose entity.28  Fastow volunteered to make the $11 
million investment and to make himself owner of the special-
purpose entity, despite being a senior executive at Enron, a clear 
conflict of interest.29  Skilling, much to his credit, denied Fastow’s 
request.30  Fastow decided to put one of his cronies, Michael 
Kopper, in charge of the special-purpose entity; Kopper was not 
senior management, but was an Enron employee.  That fact would 
not have to be stated on Enron’s proxy statements.31  The board 
approved the deal.32  Skilling made Fastow Enron’s CFO in 1998 as 
a result of these transactions because he got the job done.33  After 
he was made CFO, Fastow finally got what he wanted—he was made 
the “outside” owner of two special-purpose entities.34 
In addition, other Enron employees participated in behavior 
that would appall most people.  Successful men degraded women.35  
There were also many excesses from the executives.36  Enron 
executives mocked executives from other corporations because 
they believed the other executives were losers.37  Altogether, Enron 
considered its own lack of professionalism as a bit of a joke.38 
III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AS A RESPONSE 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was the government’s response 
to Enron-like corporate scandals.  It is interesting to ponder 
whether the changes in the law would have prevented the Enron 
scandal as described in Power Failure.  While certain provisions of 
SOX are discussed below, it is important to remember that there 
are several other provisions of SOX that relate to Enron.39 
 
 28. See id. at 161. 
 29. See id. at 162. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 163. The board minutes showed that Kopper’s involvement was 
not discussed. Id. 
 33. See id. at 164. 
 34. See id. at 172-73.  The board approved this transaction and waived any 
conflict of interest.  See id. 
 35. See id. at 79.  Ken Rice talked about how he wished Rebecca Mark’s breasts 
were larger.  See id. at 194. 
 36. See id. at 193-96. 
 37. See id. at 8. 
 38. See id. at 79. 
 39. See § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (certification of SEC reports by officers); § 304, 
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In response to the special-purpose entities that brought Fastow 
to power, Congress and the President ordered a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) Study in SOX of special-purpose 
entities40 and the investment banks that helped Enron structure 
these deals.41  Before Enron, federal financial regulators did not 
consider these special-purpose entities to be high risk;42 however, 
after the Enron scandal, federal regulators will take a closer look at 
these transactions.43  Merely taking a “closer look” at Enron is 
dubious because, with the amount of power that Enron executives 
had, it is doubtful that a closer look by the government would have 
stopped Fastow. 
Additionally, SOX added conflict-of-interest provisions to 
prevent directors and officers from Enron-like conflict-of-interest 
transactions by requiring directors, officers, and owners of ten 
percent or more of a corporation to report that fact to the SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission).44  For example, Fastow 
would have been required to report his interest in the special-
purpose entities that he owned because he was an officer at Enron.  
While this sounds good and is a step in the right direction, the 
conflict-of-interest transactions involving Kopper would not have to 
be reported to the SEC because Kopper was not an officer or a 
board member and did not own at least ten percent of the 
securities.  To catch special-purpose entities, Congress should cast a 
wider net that requires people like Kopper to report to the SEC. 
Further, SOX requires issuers of certain securities to have 
either a code of ethics for their chief financial officers or an 
explanation of why the corporation does not have a code.45  
Therefore, CFOs like Andy Fastow would be required to adhere to 
a code of ethics if Enron had one.  While it is questionable whether 
Fastow would have adhered to such a code, SOX allows a 
corporation not to adopt a code of ethics if the corporation has a 
 
116 Stat. at 778 (forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits by officers); § 807, 116 
Stat. at 804 (criminal penalties for fraud of investors in publicly traded 
companies). 
 40. See id. § 401(c), 116 Stat. at 786. 
 41. See id. § 705(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 799. 
 42. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INVESTMENT BANKS: THE ROLE OF FIRMS 
AND THEIR ANALYSTS WITH ENRON AND GLOBAL CROSSING 5-6 (March 2003), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03511.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 43. See id. at 6. 
 44. See § 403(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 788 (amending section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
 45. See id. § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789. 
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reason for that decision.  I can see no reason why a corporation 
should not have a code of ethics for its CFO because the CFO is a 
fiduciary position, like a lawyer, and lawyers have an extensive 
ethical code.46 
If SOX had been in place during the Enron scandal, the 
results of the scandal may have been different; however, I doubt 
the difference would have been substantial. 
IV. ENRON EXECUTIVES’ LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
Fastow, Kopper, and Skilling are in hot water because of the 
conflict-of-interest and special-purpose entity transactions.  Fastow 
was sentenced to ten years in prison and forced to pay back more 
than $23 million.47  Kopper had to pay back $12 million and can 
never be an officer or director of a public company.48  Most 
recently, Skilling was charged with fraud in violation of federal 
securities law.49  However, Lay claims that he “had no knowledge of 
Enron’s ‘special purpose entities’ that Fastow created . . . 
illegally . . . or that Fastow . . . [was] siphoning money into [his] 
own pocket[].”50 
While Lay’s claims of innocence, and Skilling’s to a lesser 
extent, appear to be supported by the book,51 these claims seem 
hollow.  First, both were top executives and board members, which 
 
 46. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2004); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2004). 
 47. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC SETTLES CIVIL FRAUD 
CHARGES FILED AGAINST ANDREW S. FASTOW, FORMER ENRON CHIEF FINANCIAL 
OFFICER, ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RELEASE NO. 1942, LITIGATION RELEASE No. 
18543 (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
lr18543.htm (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 48. See SEC CHARGES A FORMER HIGH-RANKING ENRON OFFICIAL WITH FRAUD, 
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RELEASE NO. 1617, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 17692 (Aug. 
21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17692.htm (last 
visited May 15, 2004). 
 49. See SEC CHARGES JEFFREY K. SKILLING, ENRON’S FORMER PRESIDENT, CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, WITH FRAUD, ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING ENFORCEMENT RELEASE NO. 1959, LITIGATION RELEASE No. 18582 (Feb. 19, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18582.htm (last 
visited May 15, 2004). 
 50. Matt Daily, Enron’s Ken Lay Denies Wrongdoing, THE FREE PRESS OF NAMIBIA, 
Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.namibian.com.na/2004/january/ 
marketplace/041C50118F.html (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 51. According to the book, Lay seemed more interested in the public face of 
Enron, not running the business.  See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 24, 
196, 120, 195.  This is more consistent with a CEO who does not know what other 
members of upper management are doing. 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/11
KEHNER- READY.DOC 5/20/2004  9:44 PM 
2004] CROOKED BUSINESS, ENRON STYLE 1587 
meant that they signed off on Fastow’s transactions which included 
the special-purpose entities and conflict-of-interest transactions.  
Second, Lay, as CEO, is responsible for the people under him, 
especially since Lay admits that he trusted Fastow.52  While Skilling 
may have had no idea about the specific details of Fastow’s 
schemes, Skilling has some level of culpability because he chose to 
turn the other way and was not concerned about how the 
transactions were completed. 
Additionally, the punishment of Fastow and Kopper is 
inadequate because Fastow and the Enron executives took away so 
much from so many people.  For example, Diana Peters, a former 
Enron employee, lost $75,000 in her 401(k), her pension, her 
health insurance, and her job when Enron went under.53  A short 
time after losing her job and health insurance, Peters’ husband was 
diagnosed with a brain tumor.54  This is in addition to the stigma of 
being an ex-Enron employee looking for a job in a tight job 
market, even though most employees did nothing wrong.  The 
losses of the rank-and-file employees can be contrasted against the 
twenty members of upper-level management who received seventy-
five percent of the $55 million set aside for severance pay for Enron 
employees before Enron declared bankruptcy.55 
V. CONCLUSION 
Power Failure provides interesting insight into Enron and the 
legislation following the Enron scandal.  While the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is certainly a good start to preventing more Enrons, it does not 
go far enough in certain respects. The problems manifested in 
Power Failure are still possible because no act of Congress can 
address the underlying issue of the occasional crooked corporate 
officer or director.  While some social commentary suggests that 
the problem is pervasive,56 I believe that it is rare.  Simply put, 
investors need more protections, like SOX, to weed out crooked 
officers and directors. 
 
 52. See id. at 311. 
 53. Mike von Fremd, One-Sided Deal (Jan. 8, 2004), at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/Business/Enron_pleadeal_reaction040108.
html (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 342-43. 
 56. See John LeBoutillier, A Culture of Lying: Jeff Skilling and the Entire Enron 
Mess, ETHERZONE, Feb. 20, 2002, at http://www.etherzone.com/2002/lebo022002. 
shtml (last visited May 15, 2004). 
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